主  題:The effect of Chinese Shadow Banking on Capital Adequacy: Does Corporate Governance matter?

內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介:This study examined two issues. First, we proposed the risk-taking hypothesis to investigate whether a bank that engages in shadow banking tends to take considerable risks. Second, we examined whether good corporate governance can enhance or mitigate this effect of shadow banking on risk-taking. Our sample consists of 59 Chinese banks during 2010 to 2016. We represented shadow banking with three trust beneficiary rights: financial assets purchased under resale agreements, financial assets available for sale, and investment securities received. Our results support the risk-taking hypothesis and the tendency of good governance to significantly reduce the effect of shadow banking on risk-taking.

報(bào)告人:吳孟紋      副教授

時(shí)  間:2018-11-28    13:30

地  點(diǎn):位育樓117

舉辦單位:銀行與貨幣研究院