主  題:“中庸”悖論

內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介:運(yùn)用聲譽(yù)信號(hào)模型來(lái)分析領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的選拔問(wèn)題。我們考慮一個(gè)擁有兩層架構(gòu)的簡(jiǎn)化企業(yè)，企業(yè)中有一個(gè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)和一個(gè)管理者。管理者向領(lǐng)導(dǎo)提議有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的創(chuàng)新項(xiàng)目，并可以選擇進(jìn)行前期投入來(lái)提高此項(xiàng)目的價(jià)值。領(lǐng)導(dǎo)決定是否采用此項(xiàng)目。領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的能力為私人信息，市場(chǎng)根據(jù)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的決策和結(jié)果來(lái)更新對(duì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)能力的判斷。在均衡中，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)對(duì)名譽(yù)的考慮可能引起過(guò)度保守。本文有兩個(gè)主要結(jié)論：盡管對(duì)名譽(yù)的考慮會(huì)帶來(lái)某種扭曲，然而這種考量可能會(huì)給企業(yè)帶來(lái)好處，原因在于它會(huì)激勵(lì)管理者努力投入來(lái)提高項(xiàng)目?jī)r(jià)值；其次，市場(chǎng)對(duì)于領(lǐng)導(dǎo)能力的預(yù)判和企業(yè)績(jī)效之間存在一個(gè)非單調(diào)的關(guān)系。這意味著可能存在中庸的悖論：企業(yè)有可能從任用一個(gè)“看上去”中庸的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)中獲益。

We consider a two-agent hierarchical organization with a leader and a manager in a reputation-signaling model. The manager proposes an innovative but risky project to the leader, and decides whether to exert an effort to improve the value of the project, which benets the organization. The leader decides whether to endorse the project or block it. The leader's competence is her private information, and the market updates its belief about the leader's type based on observation of her action (endorsing the project or blocking it) and its outcome. In equilibrium, the leader could behave excessively conservatively when she is subject to reputation concerns. We have two main findings. First, aside from its usual distortionary effects, the leader's reputation concern has a beneficial effect by inducing the manager to supply productive effort and improves the organization's performance. Second, there exists a nonmonotonic relationship between the perceived competence of the leader and the performance of the organization. As a result, a paradox of mediocracy emerges: The organization may benet from a seemingly mediocre leader, as a mediocre leader motivates the manager to exert eort, which osets the eciency loss due to incorrect decisions.

報(bào)告人:喬雪      副教授

時(shí)  間:2019-03-20    15:30

地  點(diǎn):位育樓117

舉辦單位:城市發(fā)展研究院  科研部